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    “I always try to write pour ceux qui savent lire” 
        — Sebald  
 
 
Narratives of memory written to create a time lost or recover an originary 
scene from which the present derives its significance have little in 
common with Sebald’s narrative practice.  Sebald engages with how the 
past survives through the experience of the time of its passing.  While it is 
tempting to restrict the time of this experience to a present point 
abstracted out of time, a point with all the characteristics of being 
modern (new, original, separated irremediably from the past) such 
experience becomes in Sebald a journey amongst places haunted by 
events and histories each of which promise a past by resisting its return.  
These narratives of journeying derive their significance from Sebald’s 
persistent engagement with this resistance even in those places – and 
objects such as photographs – where a sense of the past seems so 
palpably, even viscerally present.  While the carefulness of Sebald’s 
writing embodies this quality, it also occurs with the irruption of the visual 
into his narratives, most notably by means of the photographs, postcards, 
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or images borrowed from other books.  The photograph’s temporal 
framing of a subject within place – so ubiquitous as to indicate a 
condition of the photographic image and its apparatus – allows it to offer 
a moment where a human life is preserved, seemingly unchanged for 
the gaze of future generations.  Despite this aspect, photographs in 
Sebald’s narratives are not supplements for an inadequacy of description 
or representation – as if his writing only aspired to the condition of the 
visual, that is, to return the narrator, his characters, and his readers to the 
scenes that animate their journeys.  These photographic images haunt 
Sebald’s writing while shaping its relation to a world whose meaning is 
an engagement with memory and the resistance of time to an 
entrapment within a specific place.1  The visual directness of 
photographs are an easy metaphor for such entrapment – more so than 
the mediations of language where an image composed of words does 
not restrict those words from relocation to another image, another place.  
However, their presence in Sebald’s writing is far from being a visual 
index for what has been described by Sebald’s language as well as 
being far from performing some kind of interruptive role that would 
merely extend the interruptive practice of much modernist writing and 
the “experimental” or “contemporary” forms that were its heirs in the later 
twentieth century.  What the presence of these photographs indicate in 
Sebald’s writing are questions that affect the received understanding of 
narrative and its formal heritage.  They articulate what always remains 
under threat within such a heritage.  For Sebald, the event that marks the 
beginning of memory only survives apart from that event and the place in 
which it occurred, precisely the opposite to what a heritage claims or 
what the received practice of modern narrative in the twentieth-century 
has continued through its retreat to formally defined, experimental writing 
that preserves this heritage albeit negatively.2 
Sebald’s writing questions the extent to which memory attains 
significance through a resort to purpose – either historical purpose 
because what is remembered is embodied with an intention that it fulfills 
or because the task of remembering is to insert a purpose and in this 
way make the passing of time comprehensible.  In distinction to a 
purposeful activity, memory in Sebald’s Austerlitz stakes out an ethical 
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undertaking. 3  Sebald reorients the presence of memory in our 
engagement with the past, questions what constitutes that memory as its 
relation to place and history, as well as to visual and linguistic 
representation.  Above all, it is a memory embedded in a practice of 
writing for which there is no clear generic guide.  As the epigraph to this 
paper indicates, such an account of the experience of memory is pour 
ceux qui savent lire. 
A crucial aspect of this reading appears in the first sentence of 
Austerlitz when the narrator signals we are placed on guard against 
clarity of purpose as the sole organizing principle of the narrator’s 
journeying:   
In the second half of the 1960s I traveled repeatedly from 
England to Belgium, partly for study purposes 
(Studienzwecken), partly, to myself, not entirely clear 
reasons (nicht recht erfindlichen Gründen), staying 
sometimes for just one or two days, sometimes for 
several weeks. (3/9 trans. modified)4 
In this opening sentence, Sebald places purposes (Studienzwecken) 
alongside reasons (Gründen) but not simply because they are close 
synonyms that allow him to avoid the pedestrian prosaicness of “partly 
for one purpose, partly for another purpose.”  This placing of purpose 
against reason when the travel is not oriented towards study suggests 
that acting according to purpose is not necessarily the same as acting 
according to reason.  This difference becomes more pronounced when 
the narrator qualifies these reasons as “never entirely clear to me,” 
indicating difficulty in discerning a precise cause or purpose for this part 
of his journeys.  And, as if it were not bad enough to repeatedly 
undertake a journey without full knowledge of why it was undertaken, the 
journey itself, as Sebald’s words indicate, did not reveal either what those 
reasons were since they remained “never entirely clear.”  Beyond the 
defined purposes of study, which cannot account fully for these journeys, 
there remains an aspect of journeying that does not belong to purposes 
and only has an uncertain sense of possessing a reason.   
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The language of Sebald’s German text clarifies further the status of 
these “unclear” reasons and their difference to purpose.  Here is Sebald’s 
German wording for the phrase translated as “partly for other reasons 
which were never entirely clear to me”:  “teilweise aus anderen, mir 
selber, nicht recht erfindlichen Gründe.”  A more strictly literal translation 
reads, “partly for other, to me, not rightly fabricated reasons.”  This 
rendering emphasizes follows the syntactic unfolding of Sebald’s 
German, in particular the place of the interpolated words, of “to me” in a 
phrase that addresses the purposive claim of reasons.  At face value, this 
suggests that the role of the narrator is not only subjective but a judging 
subject--as if the lack of clarity is only attributable so the narrator’s 
subjectivity.  As the more literal translation given above indicates, the 
difficulty posed by these reasons is more complex and not easily 
explained away by a recourse to the subjective. The English translation, 
in which “not clear” renders “nicht recht erfindlichen Gründe,” holds in 
reserve a rational clarity that could override the narrator’s shortcomings, 
that is, it leaves the idea of reason or purpose intact and blames the 
narrator rather than reason for any shortcoming.  Sebald’s German states 
more exactly what a clear reason would be.  In this phrase, retaining 
nicht recht as “not entirely,” “not quite,” or “not rightly” makes less 
difference than the word they qualify: “erfindlichen.”  If we insist on 
hearing the sense of the verb erfinden, to fabricate, invent, fictionalize, 
within the adverb erfindlich then Sebald’s text announces that its 
narrative is not definable according to recalled purposes alone.  Rather, 
the narrator’s travels harbor reasons from which a sense of fabrication is 
not separable.  Such a reason is therefore not the opposite of fiction or 
the subjectivity of a narrator but retains a fictionality or fabricatedness 
that is proper to it.  What seems deficient to the narrator is that the 
reasons for these trips are rightly invented, fabricated or fictionalized.  As 
a result, attentively reading erfinden in erfindlich points to a lack of clarity 
about place and its ability to affirm why a journey has been undertaken.  
Consequently, what this passage does is to mark this narrative as 
haunted by a past lacking nostalgia, sentimentality, or other forms of 
emotion defined by the rationalizing force of a reason or purpose.  The 
question arising from Sebald’s narrative practice is that the price reason 
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and purpose pay for their clarity is an unavoidable invention, fabrication, 
fiction. 
Still, there is also a delicate ambiguity here.  Do fabricated reasons 
retain an element that is “right,” “correct” if not clear (recht)?  Sebald 
poses the challenge of locating not just the reason for these journeys but 
also what part of that reason is correctly, rightly or even clearly a reason 
since such a reason also requires fabricatedness?  In addition, there is 
the difficulty of locating any such reason in relation to the narrator.  The 
narrator states, “to me, myself, not rightly fabricated reasons.”  The 
emphasis on “to me, myself” (mir, selber), indicates how these not 
entirely clear/fabricated reasons appear to the narrator in relation to 
travels that do not clarify or fulfill the purpose that is their occasion.   
This more complex account of the relation between reason and 
purpose on the one hand and fiction or fabricatedness on the other 
explains the separation between subject and place present in the 
opening sentence of Austerlitz.  The journeys undertaken in this work 
traverse places that do not yield the experience of the time associated 
with them but rather an experience of time expressed as a memory 
whose unfolding does not rightly fabricate those journeys.  Again, this is 
not because the human capacity to remember is inaccurate or faulty – a 
belief that seems to indicate or at least hope that there could be 
something better.  Rather, what affects the narrator of Austerlitz is also an 
effect of the narrative in which the narrator is situated.   
A remark by Austerlitz in which he relates the effect of travelling on  
both memory and narrative develops this situation.  Reflecting on the 
relation of travelling to time, Austerlitz observes in the first of his 
conversations with the narrator that, after the passing of time (“after a 
while”) in which nothing takes place, travelling produces an illusory 
relation between time and the space:  
Certainly, said Austerlitz after a while (nach einer Weile), 
the relationship of time and space as we experience it in 
travelling, has to this day something illusionistic and 
illusory which is why we also, every time we come home 
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from elsewhere, never know with certainty whether we 
really went away.  (12/22; trans. modified) 
What relates time to space in travelling is an illusion that does not allow 
the destination or place visited to claim for itself a time in which its 
significance is decided.  This inability is so great for Austerlitz that that 
“every time he comes home” he cannot know with any certainty whether 
his travelling even took place.  Austerlitz distances himself from a sense 
of time that defaults to the place of origin (home) when it can find no 
place in which to lodge itself.  However, inasmuch as Austerlitz cannot 
know if he has in fact travelled the obverse of this is also true: he cannot 
also know if he has remained at home.  Until this question posed by 
travelling is resolved, the time of travelling is neither defined positively (by 
knowing for sure that a place travelled to is the locus of significance for 
the travelling) nor is it defined negatively (by knowing that one was 
always at the place of origin because no travel took place).  In either 
case, time remains unclaimed by either space or the places that occupy 
space; it uncompromisingly refuses place as the defining reason of 
travel.  The significance of the time of travelling as a different experience 
of time emerges here as what stands apart from the tendency to 
subsume both travelling and time into place as its purpose.  The 
consequence of this understanding is that travel is not the experience of 
place as an inherited history.  Here, the narrator’s emphasis on self-
reference (“mir selber nicht recht erfindlichen Gründen [to me, myself, not 
rightly fabricated reasons]”) returns with a crucial emphasis on this 
uncertainty as an experience of the time that both Sebald’s narrator and 
subject of his narration, Austerlitz, are continually within.   
Austerlitz’s reflection indicates that the time of travel does not end in 
the experience of place and nor does not it receive spatial justification 
even when it occurs through space.  As the narrator recalls his own 
encounters with Austerlitz in Belgium, travel produces unintended 
crossings whose reasons remain unknown: 
on every one of my completely unplanned (ganz und gar 
planlosen) Belgian excursions at that time, our paths 
crossed in a way that is inconceivable (unbegreifliche) to 
me to this day.    (27/44; trans. modified) 
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These crossings, which originate and organize the narrative of Austerlitz, 
are not only “unplanned” but also, even in memory, the reason for their 
occurrence remains “inconceivable.”  The Centraal railway station in 
Antwerp, in which the first meeting of the narrator and Austerlitz happens, 
underlines this aspect of their history.  Not only does the first of these 
“inconceivable” crossings occur in a railway station, a place for the 
origination of a planned journey, but also the actual location for their first 
meeting is in an area of the station named the Salle des pas perdus 
[Room of the lost/useless steps]5--a place whose name indicates that 
travelling, in the form of walking, has no purpose.  To begin the narrative 
of Austerlitz in such an area within such a building is to establish the 
coincidence that originates the narrative about Austerlitz as an 
experience of time, waiting, that has coincidence as its origin, and has 
already lost a destination for its means of movement.6  Furthermore, 
within this scene of origination there is the sense that the space that  
promises destination, the railway station, also contains a space that runs 
counter to that promise.  The crossing that drives the narrative of 
Austerlitz thus establishes a sense of time not measured or punctuated 
by what precedes or follows it.7 
While this first encounter sets “pas perdus” against the more 
rigorously directional purpose of train travel, it also sets up the possibility 
of continuity and repetition when Austerlitz and the narrator arrange to 
meet again.  When they do meet, the narrator tells us that Austerlitz 
continues the observations of the preceding evening as if there had been 
no intervening time: “And just as he had finished with these words the 
first evening, so Austerlitz continued his observations the following day” 
(13/23).  The narrator’s subsequent remark on Austerlitz’s manner of 
speaking, which occurs in the narrative placed between the first and 
second meeting, emphasizes this sense of focus and continuity as a 
characteristic that distinguishes the narrative of memory from any 
absorption into what it remembers: 
It was for me astonishing how Austerlitz fabricated his 
thoughts during conversations, how he could develop, as 
if in a state of distraction (sozusagen aus der 
Zerstreutheit), the most balanced sentences, and how, for 
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him, the narrator-like (erzählersiche) mediation of his 
experience/knowledge about things (Sachkenntnisse) 
was a gradual approach (schrittweise Annäherung) to a 
kind of historical metaphysics, in which what is 
remembered (das Erinnerte) became once again living.” 
(12-13/22-23; trans. modified).  
Austerlitz does not make past events living by making them live again as 
if the past were living again.  He makes what has been subject to 
memory – das Erinnerte – become living in the work of remembering.  In 
this way, what becomes living does so in its “approach” or 
“approximation” to “a kind of historical metaphysics.”  “Approach” and 
“kind of” qualify any conclusion that his words are a historical 
metaphysics.  Austerlitz approaches such a history without becoming it.  
The significance of his sentences as an approach cannot be 
overemphasized.  Nor can the narrator’s observation that his approach 
occurs “gradually.”  Furthermore, when the sense of Schritt as a “step” is 
recovered in the word for gradually, “schrittweise,” present in this word is 
recovered, the narrator identifies that the living nature of this memory 
and the sentences that express it also have a relation to walking in the 
sense of taking steps.  Like “Salle des pas perdus.” the area in Antwerp’s 
Centraal Station where Austerlitz’s observations are given and where 
their sequence of meetings originates, Austerlitz’s “most balanced 
sentences” do not complete their journey.  Were they to do so, were they 
to become fully metaphysical, and arrive at a stasis of knowledge that 
privileges place to the detriment of time, then history, its occurrence as 
time defined in a place and the knowledge of that occurrence would be 
one and the same: a historical metaphysics. 
There is still another layer that relates their conversations to the place 
in which they first occur.  During the course of the first conversation, 
Austerlitz speaks about the mirrors in the Salle des pas perdus and their 
fabrication.  These mirrors, and how they are addressed by Austerlitz, 
help explain the subsequent displacement of a “historical metaphysics” 
into the formal balance of his sentences.  The narrator confides: 
I shall never forget how he concluded his comments on 
the fabrication of the tall waiting room mirrors (der hohen 
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Wartesaalspiegel) by asking, glancing up once more at 
their dimly shimmering surfaces (mattschimmernden 
Flächen) as he left, combien des ouvriers périrent, lors de 
la manufacture de tels miroirs …8  (13/23) 
What the narrator will never forget is precisely what the surfaces of the 
mirrors do not reflect: their own history.  Not only does their ability to 
reflect give way to surfaces that are dimly shimmering 
(mattschimmernden) rather than giving access to a reflected image but 
also Austerlitz’s glance towards these surfaces becomes the event that 
spurs a question that seeks historical knowledge about the mirrors.  After 
emphasizing the surface of the mirror, Austerlitz poses an unanswered 
question concerning how many died in the manufacture of these mirrors.  
The answer is not something a mirror can reflect nor can a mirror narrate 
a history that tells the story of those who died.  Is this why the question 
appears in another language in Sebald’s text, French?  By making 
Austerlitz pose the question in this way Sebald indicates that the history 
of these mirrors is one that concludes in something foreign.  But, this 
history of the manufacturing or fabrication of the mirrors, why does it 
conclude with death?  Like the shift to another language, the conclusion 
stands in contrast to the “most balanced” sentences in which Austerlitz 
speaks; it shifts abruptly from the history of an architectural object to a 
human history.  In the German edition, this shift is seamless.  There is no 
italicization of the French.  Neither the sentence in which the narrator 
recalls this question nor the language of the question are marked off as 
separate within the narrative.  In the German edition, the French is not 
externalized within the narrative thus indicating that something foreign, 
and something like death already inhabits this narrative and that both 
these elements appear at a moment of discontinuity that remains 
internal to the narrative. 
Experiencing this discontinuity as a sense of time appears most 
clearly when the narrator, after a second day of conversation with 
Austerlitz at the Glove Market returns to that same location in the hope 
that Austerlitz “might perhaps appear again [möchte vielleicht wieder 
auftauchen]” (19/32).  Austerlitz does not appear.  What occurs instead is 
the refusal of this third crossing, as an intended, arranged event in which 
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the promise that time and place is one will be fulfilled.  Austerlitz’s non-
appearance denies the narrator’s expectation that his encounters on the 
first and second days of his acquaintance with Austerlitz establish a 
repetition that can be predicted (an expectation already placed under 
doubt by the narrator’s qualification “might perhaps appear”).  This denial 
interrupts an historical metaphysic as the reason for their encounters – as 
if they had been destined to meet in the same way that a train is destined 
to follow a pre-determined path and, accordingly, justify a destination as 
the reason for its movement.  Because Austerlitz does not appear, the 
narrator remains in a state of waiting, is left with time on his hands in a 
place that, despite Austerlitz’s presence there on the preceding day, can 
do nothing to repeat that past in a present now defined by unfulfilled 
expectation.  For Austerlitz to have appeared on the third day would be to 
create the illusion that the significance of time resides in its surrender to 
the claim of a space and its history, in this case, their preceding meeting 
at the Glove Market.  The illusion created by such a repetition distorts 
time by rendering it in terms of a place.  This distortion avoids 
recognizing the time of memory and instead claims that what constitutes 
memory is what happened in a place even if no material or living trace of 
that event appears except the shell or frame in which it occurred.  The 
distortion occurring in this memory takes the form of synthesizing time 
and space into a place so that its meaning can be lived in the presence 
of its absence.  Against this recourse of absence as the presence of the 
past, the narrator’s response asserts a sense of travel in which time and 
space do not meet despite the encoding of this possibility within the idea 
of travel.  This is why, from the first sentence of Austerlitz, travel is partly 
purposeful and partly incomplete with regard to its reasons.  This is the 
double aspect of travel that is signaled when Austerlitz’s approach to a 
historical metaphysics is first introduced and described by the narrator as 
“gradual” or, more literally, as “stepwise (schrittweise).”9   
In the journey that arises from Austerlitz’s non-appearance this use of 
space as a distortion of time is made present by the narrator’s visit to the 
fortifications of Breendonk.10  This visit not only replaces the time left open 
by Austerlitz’s non-appearance at the Glove Market on the third day but it 
also marks the transition to the narrator’s recognition of historical 
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unpredictability as the condition on which their subsequent encounters 
took place.11  The narrator describes the occasion of this trip to the fort as 
the coincidence of two circumstances that occurred while waiting for 
Austerlitz to appear:  
And as I was glancing through the newspapers while I waited I 
came upon an article… about the fortress of Breendonk… If the 
name of Breendonk had not come up in my conversation with 
Austerlitz the previous evening, this mention of it in the paper, 
even supposing I had noticed it at all, would hardly have made 
me go to see the fort that very day.  (19/32-33) 
Two elements cross here in a way that stages the encounter between 
what the narrator characterized as Austerlitz’s “gradual approach to a 
kind of historical metaphysics” and the place of purpose within travel.  
The narrator admits that the newspaper article alone would not have 
prompted him to visit the fort.  This detail indicates that the newspaper as 
the document in which history and memory are confined to the 
immediate present cannot produce a reason for travel.  Rather, the 
newspaper becomes the occasion for the narrator to recall the previous 
evening’s conversation with Austerlitz that then becomes the factor 
prompting his trip to the fort.   
Why fortifications occupy a significant place in this conversation and 
subsequently become the element that replaces Austerlitz’s presence, 
emerges if the fact that informs their existence is recognized.  
Fortifications defend place as something not to be overtaken by external 
forces.  Yet, as Austerlitz points out in his summary of the development of 
fortifications, their history tells the story of an obsolescence: once 
completed, advances in warfare overtake fortifications and render them 
obsolete.  In his account of their development, Austerlitz remarks that 
fortifications are defined by a conflict between the space they defend 
and the time for which that defense is created:  
As architectural plans for fortifications became 
increasingly complex, the time it took to build them 
increased as well, and with the probability that as soon as 
they were finished, if not before, they would have been 
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overtaken by further developments, both in artillery and in 
strategic planning, which took account of the growing 
realization that everything was decided in movement, not 
in a state of rest. (16/28) 
Fortifications defend place in a state of rest, they defend the situation of a 
particular time in that place.  Their increasing complexity and size, as 
Austerlitz implies in his concluding remarks on this evening, is 
comparable to those outsize buildings that “cast the shadow of their own 
destruction before them, and are designed from the first with an eye to 
their later existence as ruins” (19/32).  Fortifications and outsize ruins 
invoke an architecture whose temporal existence emerges from an inner 
logic that distorts their spatial purpose: to bring time to a standstill and 
maintain an historical status quo. 
In the case of the Breendonk fortress, the narrator foregrounds this 
tendency towards stasis before even visiting the fortress by prefacing his 
visit with the following history provided by the newspaper article: 
In 1940, when in the second time in its history the fort had 
to be surrendered to the Germans, it was made into a 
reception and penal camp which remained in existence 
until August 1944, and that since 1947, preserved 
unchanged (unverändert) as far as possible, it had been a 
national memorial and a museum of the Belgian 
resistance.  (19/32) 
Austerlitz’s observation about this fort being “completed just before the 
outbreak of the First World War in which, within a few months, it proved 
completely useless for the defense of the city and country” (18/31), 
establishes that the fort had no time proper to its purpose since this 
purpose was quickly nullified by the First World War.  What the 
newspaper account then communicates is that despite being rendered 
obsolete in the First World War, purpose reappears subsequently, first in 
1944, and then in 1947 when it becomes a memorial and museum.  This 
desire to preserve the fort unchanged from its 1947 state is the 
memorializing desire to establish place as a site where a time becomes 
an unchanged memory and it is this third version of defining time in this 
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place that the narrator visits.  However, what the narrator encounters at 
Breendonk is not place as memory but an experience of the 
incomprehension and the dislocation of the architectural image Austerlitz 
had provided:    
From whatever viewpoint I tried to form a picture of the 
complex it left no knowable architectural plan (sie lieβ 
keinen Bauplan erkennen), its projections and 
indentations kept shifting, so far exceeding my 
comprehension that in the end I found myself unable to 
connect it with anything shaped by human civilization, or 
even with the mute (stummen) relics or our prehistory 
and early history.  (20/33-34; trans. modified) 
The definition of space given by Austerlitz’s description of the plans for 
the fort become isolated in the narrator’s encounter as a result of their 
real physical existence in the present.  This inability to comprehend the 
fort in terms of its figuration also recognizes that prior representations, as 
well as representation itself, define a viewpoint that does not bring an 
image or a figure to a specific time.  The narrator’s presence at the fort 
provides no viewpoint to experience the arrest of time in space that an 
architectural plan promises.  The narrator’s explanation of why the plan 
or determining figure can accomplish its promise is that no such plan 
remains complete because the fort’s outline, its projections and 
indentations, “kept shifting.”  The issue here is not that the plan is unable 
to account for the history that the fortress endures.  The issue is a lack of 
relation between the fixity and stasis of the plan and the sense of 
movement that defines how an object such as the fortress is 
experienced.  Movement as the experience of time prevents recognition 
of the fort in terms of its architectural definition, that is, in terms of an 
architectural intent to provide purpose, destination, and reference 
according to spatial arrangement. 
In Sebald’s Austerlitz, the disjunction of time and space that defines 
the missed crossing with Austerlitz at the Glove Market carries over into 
the visit to Breendonk that takes the place of that meeting.  Instead of 
continuing a conversation as if there had been no intervening break 
(which is how the narrator describes his conversation with Austerlitz from 
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the first to the second day), the narrator undertakes a journey that 
becomes the search for a memory that would inform the figures, images, 
and representations through which the fortress is given significance. 12  
What takes place in the time of their missed meeting is the experience 
that the meaning of an event is the illusion that space holds the memory 
of time.  What emerges from this experience is a recognition that the 
experience of time in the place of memory remains despite the historical 
metaphysics that instigate the journey in which that experience happens 
or which instigate the expectation that Austerlitz will be at the Glove 
Market on the third day.  This disjunction between place and memory 
becomes the destination of the narrator’s journey.  Here, the destination 
is an end for fortresses – Breendonk is the last fort built in this line of 
defenses around Antwerp (with the Centraal Station named as a center, 
the journey of the narrator is from the center to the periphery since 
Breendonk is located on the outskirts of Antwerp).  In this respect, the 
narrator travels to a destination from which an experience of the time of 
memory emerges as place becomes known as peripheral, obsolescent 
and surrenders its control of time.  
The experience the narrator communicates is not restricted to the 
outside of the structures at Breendonk – as if the failure of the form of the 
fort to confirm or mirror its images or plans were simply a matter of 
viewpoint.  In the narrator’s recounting of the guided tour of the fort, this 
disjunctive end also emerges: 
My memory of the fourteen stations which the visitor to 
Breendonk passes between the entrance and the exit has 
clouded over in the course of time (verdunkelt im Laufe 
der Zeit), or perhaps I could say it clouded over already 
on the day when I was in the fort, whether because I did 
not really want to see what was to be seen there or 
whether because in this world illuminated only by the 
faint appearance of a few dim lights, and cut off forever 
from the light of nature, the outlines of things appeared to 
dissolve.  (23-24/39)  
The disjunction of time and space appears as the darkening (verdunkeln) 
or clouding over that occurs at both the time of this visit and in the course 
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of time since the visit.  The narrator appeals to the latter first, to what is the 
more normal and predictable account of memory and the passage of 
time.  But then the narrator traces this effect of time and memory back to 
the visit which is being remembered and, using exactly the same verb, 
verdunkeln, recalls how a clouding over may already have been at work 
during the visit to Breendonk.  The clouding over which is recounted 
second is given two very different explanations: one, psychological (the 
narrator not wanting to see what was visible at Breendonk), and the 
other, external and material (an inability to see because of the faintness of 
the electric illumination).  No decision is offered about which of these two 
possibilities is decisive.  Instead, the narrator turns to the captions that 
name each of the fourteen stations and describes, how, in the present, 
the attempt to recall their meaning through either memory or reading 
does not lift the clouding over that remained unresolved between a 
psychological block and inadequate illumination: 
Even now, when I try to remember them [the fourteen 
stations], when I look back at the crab-like plan of 
Breendonk and read the words of the captions –Former 
Office, Printing Works, Huts, Jacques Ochs hall, Solitary 
Confinement Cell, Mortuary, Relics Store, and Museum –
the darkness [Dunkel] does not lift but becomes yet heavier 
and I think how little we can hold in mind, how everything 
is constantly lapsing into oblivion with every extinguished 
life, how the world is, as it were, draining itself, in that the 
history of countless places and objects, which themselves 
have no power of memory is never heard, never described 
or passed on.  (23-24/38-39)   
Rather than arriving at illumination, the previous clouding over now 
intensifies into a darkness (verdunkeln becomes Dunkel).  Remembering 
alone does not arrive at illumination and neither does the recourse to 
reading as a supplement to a memory affected by either of the 
experiences that interfered with the narrator’s visit: unwillingness to see or 
faint illumination.  The captions, all of which name places, promise a 
space in which meaning occurs individually and as a journey, as if these 
stations also carried the overdetermined significance of the fourteen 
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Stations of the Cross.  Where this over-determination would preserve a 
prescribed meaning in Christian allegory, the same does not occur for the 
narrator whose experience of Breendonk’s fourteen stations does not 
produce a repeatable history.  For the narrator, there is no metaphysical 
conclusion whereby the representation of history is also the meaning the 
presence of that history.  Instead, the narrator only recognizes that 
memory and the representation of the past through names that cannot 
recall such a past to the present is an index to a continuing 
disappearance since the meaning of remembrance does not belong to 
object, place, or stations –whether of the cross or of all the journeys that 
begin in the Salle des pas perdus.  To claim a memory in those countless 
places and objects is to claim that memory does not belong to the course 
of time in which the narrator’s experience of a clouding over and 
darkness happens.  As the narrator observes, a history that belongs to 
place or object is a history that remains unheard since the experience of 
memory alone possesses the ability to speak. What the narrator faces at 
Breendonk is another history, the history of a faithfulness to every 
extinguished life, a faithfulness that preserves memory from fetishizing the 
past in a place or an object, and, in so doing, preserves memory from the 
purposes, political and ideological, which its objectification introduces.  
Against this, to remember, as this visit to the fort recalls, is to refuse the 
guided tour in which the shifting movement of time becomes a 
repeatable action directing the steps of travelers to specific locations 
each with their own localizing caption.  The narrator experiences this 
memorializing as the draining of the world, a draining that leaves behind 
a place that history inhabits as the absence of a presence that no 
memory can hold in mind.  What the narrator recognizes at this moment 
is that memory is what remains from the time in which we traverse the 
present and not what precedes that traversing.  
Nowhere is this recognition put to the test more than in the interplay 
between language and visual image in Sebald’s writing and, in particular, 
by the appearance of photographs within the narrative.  Such 
photographs can easily affirm an illustrative effect, for instance, when 
Sebald after describing the fort at Breendonk as a “world illuminated only 
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by a few dim electric bulbs” inserts a picture showing a passage lit by 
such bulbs: 
   
 
 
This illustrative intent operates with a kind of naïveté as if this image 
could encapsulate so much more effectively the destination that the 
narrator’s words aim at.  The photograph of the passage is, however, not 
simply illustrative.  Despite the immediate connection between this 
photograph and the narrator’s reference to electric light bulbs, and 
despite the occurrence of this photograph at precisely the point when 
the narrator speaks of a world cut off from the light of nature, the light 
bulbs in this image only emit enough light to create the illusion of a 
space into which they disappear.  This illusion is precisely what the 
narrator proceeds to dispel in a passage that takes up the tunnel-like 
darkness into which the light bulbs fade but does so by foregrounding 
extensively the time in which it takes place: 
In any case, at the time, in that soundless (lautlosen) noonday 
hour in the early summer of 1967 which I spent inside the fort of 
Breendonk, without encountering any other visitors, I hardly dared 
to go on to the point where, at the end of a second long tunnel, a 
corridor not much more than the height of a man, and, as I think I 
remember (wie ich mich zu erinnern glaube), somewhat sloping, 
leads down to one of the casements.  (25/40; trans. modified) 
After over-determining markers of time to such an extent (noon, early 
summer, 1967), the narrator is reluctant to go to the place of the 
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casement that lies at the end of the tunnel-corridor.  The reason for this 
reluctance appears when two memories, prompted by the narrator’s 
staring at the grey floor of the casement, intrude into the present.  About 
these memories, the narrator remarks: “No one can explain exactly what 
happens within us when the doors behind which our childhood terrors 
lurk are flung open” (25/41).  In the case of the two memories just 
mentioned, the opening of such doors releases the place from a history 
as the narrator recalls “a picture of our laundry room at home in W.” and 
“the image of the butcher’s shop I always used to pass on my way to 
school” (25/40).  More significantly, in what follows, the door opens onto 
memories that emphatically leave behind a sense of place as embodying 
memory: 
But I do remember that there in the casement at 
Breendonk a nauseating smell of soft soap rose to my 
nostrils, and that this smell, in some strange place in my 
head, was linked to the bizarre German word for 
scrubbing brush, Wurzelbürste, which was a favorite of 
my father’s and which I had always disliked.  (25/41) 
The dislike turns to nausea, then the narrator rests his forehead against 
the wall which, to him, “seems to be perspiring with cold beads of sweat” 
(25-26/41).  The narrator’s response to the past he now experiences in 
the present sets up an associative chain that needs little to bring in the 
history of this space as a place of torture.  For the narrator to follow this 
associative path would be to deny all he has articulated about the 
limitation of time and memory to a place.  Instead of following this path, a 
more complex and richer sense of time appears: 
It was not that a presentiment rose up in me with the 
nausea of the kind of so-called intense interrogations 
which were being conducted here around the time I was 
born, since it was only a few years later that I read Jean 
Améry’s description of the dreadful physical closeness 
between torturers and their victims, and of the torture he 
himself suffered in Breendonk.  (26/41-42; trans. modified) 
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The return to historical representation enfolds a sense of time whose 
significance does not belong to the order of events.13  The nausea is not 
the register of what took place in this room.  That is a history excluded 
from the narrator’s memory at the time of this experience in the 
casement.  Only through the illusion that places and objects have a 
memory communicated by their existence as place or object could we 
claim that narrator’s nausea is the effect of a time that the casement itself 
makes felt, describes, and passes on.  The narrator is not only emphatic 
on this point (Es war nicht so), but historically precludes any such cause.  
Place does not remember, place does not see, and place does not hear. 
It is at this point that we can begin to speak of an ethics of memory in 
Sebald, of a holding to what memory is rather than what it can be 
memorialized as is the case whenever it is dislocated into a place that is 
then frozen into a false authenticity – such as Breendonk in 1947 – a 
freezing that ignores the discontinuities between Breendonk’s own past 
significances by privileging one above others.  To perform this freezing is 
to claim place as the memory of a specific time.  The issue raised by 
Sebald is that such a placement of memory risks destroying the past 
under the enormous weight of what is not present, an absence for which 
the present is an inadequate index.  In a counter to such inadequacy, 
Sebald’s Austerlitz presents an experience of memory not determined by 
the metaphysics of presence and absence and therefore not restrained 
by the politicization of place and imposition of purpose that makes every 
journey to a site of memorialization recall that purpose as its historical 
significance.  So frozen, memory can have no presence since to 
remember only death is to forget to whom memory belongs.  To do so is 
to recognize, as Sebald’s narrator does, that the significance of the 
casement at Breendonk does not preserve a memory that the narrator 
has not yet read.  Rather, memory is the imperative to read in that 
moment a sense of time that appears gradually, that is, schritt-weise, in 
steps whose historical meaning was never rightly fabricated.  Lacking 
such a history, there remains, pour ceux qui savent lire, the distorting 
illusion that restricts time to the historically reconstructed limits of a 
place.  In such a place, the past is to be re-enacted repeatedly by living 
ghosts who have journeyed there for the privilege of that enactment in a 
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kind of repetition compulsion called the experience of history.  Against 
this repetition, there emerges in Sebald an awareness of time, the time of 
the present as the only experience that narrative can still tell in the face of 
a history whose incommensurability in the 20th century risks refusing all 
experience in its darkness.  Like the narrator’s experience in the 
casement at Breendonk, this darkness recedes not only into the past but 
also into the unexperienced time of the future. 
 
 
1 Amongst the growing body of critical writing on photography and Sebald, a particularly 
extensive and useful essay stands out, Clive Scott’s “Still Life, Portrait, Photograph, 
Narrative in the work of W.G. Sebald,” in A Literature of Restitution: Crtical essays on 
W.G. Sebald, eds. Jeannette Baxter, Valerie Henitiuk and Ben Hutchinson (Manchester: 
Manchester UP, 2013) 203-230. 
2 These aspects of modern narrative belong within larger tendencies at work with the 
claims of modernity, notably, a project to control destruction by transferring it from the 
natural world to the world of science, technology, reason whereby destruction is 
controlled. The claim that the Enlightenment sets in place the logic that leads to the 
Holocaust, (see Horkheimer and Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment) would establish 
that this destructive event belongs to an inner movement of western thought initiated by 
the Enlightenment – a grand narrative of modernity that preserves itself, even in the face 
of atrocity, by assimilating destruction to reason in the modern age.  Narrative 
experimentation, the formalized “play” of chance in modern narrative remain cultural 
versions of this grand narrative through their aesthetic assimilations.  In Sebald’s 
narratives, this assimilation is always the stake hence his relentless emphasis on 
narrative embedded in a sense of time that is not oriented towards purpose nor towards 
localization of time in a particular site of memory – as if memory could be frozen into a 
singular experience of time.  For a summary of the history of the relation of Sebald to 
modernity and the Holocaust, see J.J. Long, W.G. Sebald: Image, Archive, Modernity 
(New York: Columbia UP, 2007), 2-4.   
3 What is understood by ethical here is a stance against the purposive critique of 
modernity by which criticism is invested with the power to direct historical experience.  
Carol Jacobs also addresses the ethical aspect of Sebald’s writing in her closing 
remarks to a chapter on Austerlitz in Sebald’s Vision (New York: Columbia UP, 2015).  
4 Unless otherwise noted all parenthetical page references are to Sebald’s Austerlitz.  
Reference will first be made to the English translation (trans. Anthea Bell, New York: 
Modern Library 2001) followed by the German text [first published 2001] (Frankfurt am 
Main: Fischer, 2003).   
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5 Despite the obvious translation of “Salle des pas perdus” as “waiting room,” the 
equivalent space in English catches neither the size of the space referred to in the 
Antwerp Central station nor the fact that it is not exactly as constricted as a room but is 
rather more of a hall.  See, David Danby’s “Stations, dark rooms and false worlds” (in A 
literature of restitution: Critical essays on W.G. Sebald, eds. Jeannette Baxter, Valerie 
Henitiuk and Ben Hutchinson (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2013], 166-184) for a study 
of the place of the four train stations Sebald refers to in Austerlitz, particularly, his 
remarks on darkness as a temporal and architectural characteristic of these stations.  
This darkness is examined below in relation to memory during the narrator’s visit to the 
Breendonk fort. 
6 In a 2001 interview, Sebald responded with the following remark to a question about 
inexplicable events: “this whole business of coincidence, which is very prominent in my 
writing.  I hope it’s not obtrusive.  But, you know, it does come up in the first book, in 
"Vertigo," a good deal.  I don’t particularly hold with parapsychological explanations of 
one kind or another, or Jungian theories about the subject. I find those rather tedious.  
But it seemed to me an instance that illustrates that we somehow need to make sense 
of our nonsensical existence. You meet somebody who has the same birthday as you – 
the odds are one in three hundred and sixty-five, not actually all that amazing.  But if you 
like the person then immediately this takes on more . . . and so we build on it, and I think 
all our philosophical systems, all our systems of our creed, all constructions, even the 
technological worlds, are built in that way, in order to make some sort of sense, when 
there isn’t, as we all know.”  Joe Cuomo, “A Conservation with W. G. Sebald,” [first 
published as “The Meaning of Coincidence”] in The Emergence of Memory, ed. Lynn 
Sharon Schwartz (New York: Seven Stories, 2007), 95.   
7 Why this sense of time should be given in a railway station is pertinent to the narrative 
of Austerlitz’s history since his survival, and his story, depends on a journey of 
deracination and uncertain outcome: the Kindertransport which brings Austerlitz to 
Wales and into a setting which invents a past for him in the hope that this past would 
subsequently decide his future.  Also to note: Austerlitz’s repetition of the transport of his 
mother to Terezin by rail. Austerlitz’s comments about this train journey recount a 
disorientation of himself as a subject and of time in relation to travel: “while standing on 
the platform I could not imagine who or what I was . . . When I got out of the train I felt 
as if I had been travelling for weeks, going further and further east, and further and 
further back in time”  (185-186/269-271). 
8 Just prior to encountering Austerlitz the narrator refers to these mirrors in a way that 
also emphasizes their inability to offer a literal reflection.  To the narrator they are “partly 
dull”: “the waiting room . . . struck me as . . . a curious confusion of which may of course 
have been the result of the sun’s sinking behind city rooftops just as I entered the room.  
The gleam of the gold and silver on the huge, partly dull mirrors on the wall facing the 
windows was not yet entirely extinguished” (6/13).  The translation of “halbblinde 
Spiegel” as “partly dull mirror” is offered as a more accurate rendering than “half-
obscured mirrors”) by Bettina Mosbach in her essay “Superimposition as a Narrative 
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Strategy in Austerlitz” in Searching for Sebald: Photography After W.G. Sebald, ed. Lise 
Patt and Christel Dillbohner (Los Angeles, CA: Institute of Cultural Inquiry, 2007), 409, 
n.21. The mirrors also form a temporal framing of the narrator’s crossings with Austerlitz.  
In the context of this first meeting the narrator tells us that “once Austerlitz took a 
camera out of his rucksack . . . and took several pictures of the mirrors, which were now 
quite dark (verdunkelte)” (6/13).  The narrator than continues to state that these pictures 
were given to him by Austerlitz in 1996, the date of their last meeting.  The symmetry 
and balance this might offer is not allowed to assert itself: the narrator can no longer 
find these photographs (7/15).  On the darkened aspect of these photographs, referred 
to as verdunkelte by the narrator, see the discussion below of this word in relation to 
memory during the narrator’s visit to the Breendonk fort. 
9 In the most extensive volume devoted to travel in Sebald, The Undiscover’d Country: 
W.G. Sebald and the Poetics of Travel, ed. Marus Zisselsberger (Rochester, NY: Camden 
House, 2010), the question of temporality is notable underplayed – as the title indicates, 
travel is to offer an aesthetic yield in the form of a poetics.  The emphasis here on the 
temporal engages with the limits of this way of approaching travel in Sebald. 
10 Other accounts of this passage about Breendonk can be found in, Will Stone, “At Risk 
of Internment: W.G. Sebald in Terizin and Breendonk,” Vertigo vol. 4.3 (Summer 2009); 
Ben Hutchinson, “Fort Breendonk,” in W.G. Sebald: Die Dialektische Imagination (Berlin: 
de Gruyter, 2009) 100-106.  Max Penksy, in a broader essay on ruins, rightly argues 
against seeing Sebald’s account of Breendonk as a kind of Benjaminian dialectical 
image (see, “Three Kinds of Ruin: Heidegger, Benjamin, Sebald,” in Poligrafi 16. 61/62 
[2011], esp. 85-89. 
11 Their next meeting, a few days later, is unforeseen.  The narrator, at the end of day’s 
walking arrives at a café in which he discovers Austerlitz.  His reflection on this 
encounter recalls the “improbability of our meeting again in a place like this which no 
sensible person would have sought out” (27-28/44).  Their next meeting, shortly before 
Christmas at Zeebrugge is equally unforeseen (31/49). 
12 The abruptness with which the narrator moves from recalling the reason for visiting 
the fort and the description of the journey indicates that travelling is at stake here: 
“would hardly have made me go to see the fort that very day.  The passenger train I 
boarded later that morning took a good half-hour to travel to the short distance to 
Mechelen, where a bus runs from outside the station to the small town of Willebroek; it 
is on the outskirts of this town that the fort stands . . .” (19/33). 
13 On this episode as an instance of individual suffering based in an experience of place, 
see Markus Zisselsberger, “Introduction,” in The Undiscover’d Country: W.G. Sebald and 
the Poetics of Travel (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2010), 12-16. 
